Do Election Rules Affect Deliberation? An Experiment on Deliberative Election Rules and Group Trust

Research output: Working paperResearch

Julie Nielsen, Marlene Wind

Enhanced deliberation has been prescribed as the way forward to improve democratic decision-making, while generating positive attributes like trust and legitimacy. Yet, we do not know to what extent different decision-making election rules affect the deliberative process and its outcome. This article investigates to what extent different election rules in deliberative decision-making affect group trust by testing three ideal types of election rules (i.e. a dictator election rule, a representative election rule and a consensus rule) in a laboratory experiment. The findings show that the differences in election rules have a significant impact on the level of trust after deliberation. Interestingly, however, we find that the election rule of representative democracy yield more group trust than does the election rule of pure consensus and non-hierarchical decision-making. Thus our findings challenge the understanding by deliberative normative theorists that the more inclusion and consensus in the decision-making procedure the more trust and legitimacy amongst its participants.
Original languageDanish
Number of pages28
Publication statusPublished - 22 Jan 2013

    Research areas

  • deliberation, election rules, trust game, decision-maiking processes, experiments, voting

ID: 203323136